Abstract-Campaigners, advertisers, and activists are increasingly turning to social recommendation mechanisms, provided by social media, for promoting their products, services, brands, and even ideas. However, many a time, such social network-based campaigns perform poorly in practice, because the intensity of recommendations drastically reduces beyond a few hops from the source. A natural strategy for maintaining the intensity is to provide incentives. In this paper, we address the problem of minimizing the cost incurred by the campaigner for incentivizing a fraction of individuals in the social network, while ensuring that the campaign message reaches a given expected fraction of individuals. We also address the dual problem of maximizing the campaign penetration for a resource constrained campaigner. To help us understand and solve the above-mentioned problems, we use percolation theory to formally state them as optimization problems. These problems are not amenable to traditional approaches because of a fixed point equation that needs to be solved numerically. However, we use results from reliability theory to establish some key properties of the fixed point, which in turn enables us to solve these problems using algorithms that are linearithmic in maximum node degree. Furthermore, we evaluate the efficacy of the analytical solutions by performing simulations on real-world networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
O N-LINE social networking services have enabled advertisers, campaigners and activists to reach millions of individuals. In particular, the ability to recommend or share web articles [1] , videos [2] , and other media can be harnessed by campaigners for disseminating information to a worldwide audience. While such social network based campaigns sound promising, due to the fact that ideas propagate only a few hops from their origins [3] , often, they are found to perform poorly in practice. Providing capped incentives for recommendations is a natural solution for increasing the hop count. For example, Dropbox, which offers cloud storage services, increased its customer base rapidly, by offering incentives for social recommendations [4] . To keep the cost down, they capped the referral payouts -additional 500 MB only for the first 28 referrals, i.e., the referral payout is capped at 14 GB.
An alternative mechanism to limiting the cost is to cap the number of incentivized individuals, i.e., instead of capping incentive payments, offer large referral rewards 1 to The authors are with the Department of Electronic Systems Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India (e-mail: bkotnis@ dese.iisc.ernet.in; salbert@dese.iisc.ernet.in; kuri@dese.iisc.ernet.in).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNET.2016.2645281 1 For example the living social website gives 100% cash-back on a purchased product if the customer persuades three others to buy the (same) product. Another famous example of uncapped referrals is Uber, and also the taxi service Lyft. a preselected set of individuals. 2 This approach allows the campaigner to target individuals who are best suited to use and recommend the service to their co-workers or friends.
A. Related Work
The work presented in this paper is related to [5] - [7] , where the authors model the spread of influence in social networks. In [5] - [7] , the authors consider nodes to be either active or inactive. Making an inactive node active, not through network effects, but through direct intervention for kickstarting the campaign is termed as "seeding." Assuming full knowledge of the network structure, i.e., the adjacency matrix, the question asked in [5] - [7] is, given a constraint on the number of seed nodes, what is the optimal set of seed nodes that would maximize the campaign? However, in several realworld settings, the campaigner may just have access to the statistical properties of the network. Also, the authors in [5] - [7] do not consider the cost incurred due to incentivization. Incentivization is the process of providing incentives to nodes who are already active, to persuade their friends to sign up. Incentivization happens throughout the campaign, whereas seeding, as discussed in [5] , happens only at the beginning.
A related problem involving the calculation of an optimal pricing strategy for products sold to individuals in a social network was explored in [8] and [9] . The authors in [8] and [9] consider the problem of pricing a product and calculating the amount of cash-back (discount) that is provided to individuals as an incentive to evangelize the product. In this paper, we do not focus on optimal pricing, but rather focus on the size and cost of the campaign where individuals do not incur a cost to register for the service. The problems studied in this paper are more appropriate in settings where the service is free, or is based on a freemium model. Furthermore, we only assume statistical knowledge of the network and also incorporate constraints that ensure a given campaign penetration. Whereas the algorithms proposed in [8] and [9] assume full knowledge of the network structure and do not consider any constraint on the campaign size.
The problem of computing the optimal word-of-mouth referral payment mechanisms that maximize profit was studied in [10] , by modelling the referral process as a network game. The authors in [10] conclude that a combination of linear (in the number of referrals) and threshold (when the number of referral exceeds a particular value) payment mechanisms approximates the optimal pricing scheme. In this paper, we focus on the set of nodes to be incentivized while assuming that a pricing scheme, which can be computed based on the results in [10] , is provided by the campaigner. Similar problems involving the computation of word-of-mouth referral rewards in real time, for maximizing the campaign spread, were studied using the theory of optimal control in [11] - [15] . In the economics literature, word-of-mouth referrals have been studied by modelling them as a signaling game in which agents receive signals from their neighbors about products. The campaigner exploits this game by incentivizing a few agents to manipulate the signal either during [16] , or at the launch [17] of the campaign. However, models involving network signaling games implicitly assume partial knowledge of the network structure, which may not always be available. A model of pricing and demand incorporating the effects of word-of-mouth advertising was also studied in [18] .
B. Our Contributions
We consider a scheme where preselected incentivized individuals are presented with a reward when they register for the service, encouraging them to spread the news about the service to their friends. The decision of whether to offer an incentive to an individual is precomputed based on the solution of an optimization problem. We use a variant of the linear threshold model [5] for modelling the campaign spreading process. For a given fraction of such incentivized individuals, we first compute the campaign size (expected fraction of registered individuals) using bootstrap percolation. We then use this quantity to formulate the following optimization problems: 1). minimize the cost for achieving a given expected fraction of registered individuals, and 2). maximize the expected fraction of registered individuals for a given cost budget. These optimization problems are not amenable to traditional approaches because of a fixed point equation that needs to be solved numerically. However, we use results from reliability theory to establish some key properties of the fixed point, which in turn enables us to solve these problems using algorithms that are linearithmic in the maximum node degree. Through extensive simulations, we also study the efficacy of our incentivization scheme in real world networks.
The key notation used in this paper are summarized in Table I . The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the campaign model. In Section III, using results from percolation theory, we compute the campaign size (expected proportion of registered individuals). Using this quantity, we formulate and solve two relevant optimization problems in Sections IV and V. In Section VI, we compare the analytical results with simulation performed on real-world networks. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude the paper.
II. MODEL
Consider a set of N = {1, 2, · · · , n} individuals who are connected to one another through a social network. For analytical tractability, as in [19] and [20] , we assume that this network is a random graph chosen from a family of 4 and locally tree like with high probability. Therefore, most of the analysis presented in this paper holds with high probability. However, to keep the presentation simple, we do not state this in the remainder of the paper. We represent this network as an undirected graph G(N , L), where N and L represent the set of nodes and links of graph G, respectively. An undirected edge (a, b) ∈ L if individuals a and b are neighbours in the underlying social network. In most scenarios, full knowledge of the network structure may not be available to the campaigner. In such scenarios, the campaigner can obtain statistical properties of the network through data mining. One such property is the degree distribution. Let {p(k), k ≥ 1} be the degree distribution of graph G.
We consider a campaign on the network represented by graph G (see Fig. 1 for the flow chart). The nodes in graph G can be either in "active", "registered" or "unregistered" state. Once active, a node remains active. Active nodes are very spirited and express strong support for the campaign by encouraging their neighbours to register, whereas nodes in the registered and unregistered states refrain from recommendations. For a node to become active, it must first show support for the campaign by registering itself. However, all registered nodes need not be active.
The campaign starts with a set of zealous individualsthose who intrinsically desire the service. These nodes do not need any recommendation to register, and are registered for the campaign from the very start. If a zealous node becomes active, it will recommend the service to its neighbours. Whereas, nodes that are not zealous, register only if the number of active neighbours exceeds a predefined threshold value (see Fig. 1 ). Let p th (m|k) denote the probability of a degree k node having threshold m. This is a generalization of the celebrated linear threshold model [5] -a model of choice for studying the dissemination and adoption of new products, technologies and ideas [22] - [25] . We note that, by definition, k≥1 p(k) · p th (0|k) denotes the fraction of zealous nodes in the network 5 -fraction of nodes that register without any recommendations.
A node that receives a reward when it registers for the service is more likely to tell its neighbours about the reward and encourage them to register. Therefore, we divide the nodes into two categories: the 'non-incentivized' (type 1) and the 'incentivized' (type 2). Let φ(k) denote the probability of incentivizing a degree k node. In this paper, we assume that the campaigner employs a randomized incentive policy and decides the fraction of incentivized nodes before the start of the campaign. 6 However, incentives are assigned based on the exact degree of the node, which can be obtained by the campaigner upon node registration. 7 Further, we also assume that these nodes become aware of the fact that they are incentivized only upon registration. Let α 1 ∈ (0, 1] and α 2 ∈ (0, 1] be the probabilities of a non-incentivized (type 1) and incentivized (type 2) nodes becoming active, respectively.
Since incentivized nodes are provided with incentives upon registration, they are more likely to be enthused, and will play an active part in the campaign than non-incentivized nodes. Therefore, we assume that α 2 > α 1 .
III. COMPUTING THE CASCADE SIZE
Before presenting the optimization problems, we need to first compute the cascade size, i.e., the expected fraction of nodes that have registered at the end of the campaign. Let p(k |k) be the probability of encountering a degree k node by traversing a link from a degree k node. From [19] , we know that this conditional distribution, for an uncorrelated network, has the following form
, where d denotes the mean degree of the graph G. Let q(k) be the probability of encountering a type 2 node by traversing a randomly chosen link from a degree k node. Then, we have
where φ(k ) denotes the probability of incentivizing a degree
Here, k max is the maximum node degree. Since the network is locally tree-like, with some effort, it can be shown that the number of type 2 neighbours of a degree k node is a binomial random variable with the probability distribution functionp(
. Let p ex (k ) be the excess degree distribution, i.e., the degree distribution of a node encountered by following a randomly chosen link without counting that link. For an uncorrelated network, from [20] , we know that
. Now, let u denote the probability of reaching a registered node by following an arbitrary edge of the graph. First, let us consider an arbitrary node j of degree k and threshold m. Next, we compute the probability that node j registers due to recommendations from its active neighbours, given that we have arrived at node j by following an arbitrary link in the graph. For ease of presentation, we do not explicitly write the condition "following an arbitrary link."
where Equality (a) follows because the events {j registers} and {j has m or more active neighbours given that j has threshold m} are equivalent, and the events {j has l active neighbours} and {j has threshold m} are independent of each other.
In Equality (1), X k2,k and Y k−k2,k are random variables that denote the number of type 2 and type 1 active neighbours of a degree k node, given that there are k 2 type 2 and k − k 2 type 1 neighbours. With some effort, it can be shown that random variables X k2,k and Y k−k2,k are independent and have a binomial distribution with parameters (k 2 , α 2 u) and (k−k 2 , α 1 u), respectively. Here, α 1 and α 2 are the probability of a type 1 and type 2 node becoming active, respectively. The independence occurs because the probability of incentivizing a node is independent of the degree of its neighbouring nodes. The binomial distribution arises here because the network is locally tree-like.
From Equation (1), it is evident that the probability of a node registering is independent of its type. 8 Therefore, the probability that by following an arbitrary link we can reach a node that registers due to recommendations is given by
P [node registers, node has threshold m| node has excess degree k]
(2) On the RHS of Equation (2), we use the excess degree distribution because we discount the link that we followed to arrive at the node. In Equality (a), we use p th (m|k + 1) because if we include the link on which we arrived, a node of excess degree k will have k + 1 links. Arguing along the lines of [20] , we can conclude that u has to satisfy the following self consistency equation
where f (q, u) is as given at the bottom of this page. 8 A node registers either if it is zealous (this event is independent of its type), or through recommendations which depend on its neighbours and type of neighbours but not on its type.
For any q, Equation (3) is a fixed point equation in u. However, due to the complex nature of the function f (q, u), the existence of a u that satisfies Equation (3) is not obvious. We note that understanding how f (q, u) changes with u involves understanding how the tail probability of a family of random variables changes with u, which can be discerned using techniques form reliability theory. Using this theory, the following proposition establishes the nature of function f (q, u) (w.r.t u).
Proposition 1 (3). Since the fixed point is unique, we can obtain u q by iteratively solving Equation (3). Our next proposition qualitatively describes the variation of the fixed point u q as function of q.
Proposition 3: If α 2 > α 1 , then u q is a strictly increasing continuous function of q, i.e., ∂uq ∂q > 0. Proof: In Appendix C. Now, given a q ∈ [0, 1], let s k (q) be the expected fraction of degree k nodes that have registered at the end of the campaign. The expression for s k (q) can be obtained as follows
where
where g k (q, u) is as given at the bottom of the previous page and u q is the fixed point of Equation (3) . Given a q ∈ [0, 1], let s(q) be the expected fraction of nodes that have registered at the end of the campaign. s(q) is also termed as the size of the epidemic. Then, using arguments similar to the ones used to derive Equation (5), it can be shown that
Once again using results from reliability theory, in Proposition 4, we establish the increasing and non-decreasing nature of functions g(q, u) and g k (q, u) (with respect to u and q).
Proof: Similar to that of Propositions 1 and 17.
IV. COST MINIMIZATION UNDER CASCADE SIZE CONSTRAINT
Providing incentives is a costly affair. Therefore, almost always, the campaigner is either interested in minimizing the cost while guaranteeing that a given proportion of population registers, or in maximizing the registrations for a given cost budget. In this section, we look at the former problem.
A. Cost of Incentivization
Incentives provided by the campaigner is usually a function of the node degree because the number of potential recommendations depend on the degree. Let c k be the cost of incentivizing a degree k node. Incentivized nodes obtain incentives only if they registers. Therefore, the expected cost per incentivized degree k node is given by c k · s k (q), where s k (q) (see Equation (4)) is the probability that an incentivized degree k node is registered at the end of the campaign. Let φ(k) denote the probability of incentivizing a degree k node. Then, the average cost per node for incentive-policy
B. Problem Formulation
Minimizing the cost while providing guarantees on the fraction of expected registrations is appropriate for campaigns where the campaigners are mandated to achieve a given campaign penetration target. This problem can be mathematically formulated as follows
where γ ∈ [0, γ max ] is the minimum expected fraction of registered individuals that must be achieved, and d is the mean node degree of the network. Here, γ max is the expected fraction of registered individuals obtained by incentivizing everyone. We note that the expression for s k (q) (Equation (4)) and s(q) (Equation (5) 
C. Solution Approach
In this section, we present transformations that allow us to efficiently compute the global optima of the cost minimization problem presented in the previous section. To help us with this task, we state and prove the following proposition. The intuition behind this proposition is that, as α 2 > α 1 , increasing q increases the proportion of type 2 nodes, which results in a higher s(q).
Proof: We have
where Equality (a) follows from an application of the chain rule. From Inequality (7) 
For the cases when γ ∈ (γ min , γ max ), due to Propositions 5, the cost minimization problem can be re-written as follows
Subject to: q ≥ q γ and q = 1
where q γ is chosen such that s(q γ ) = γ. Since γ ∈ (γ min , γ max ), we have q γ ∈ (0, 1) (see Proposition 5). The next proposition establishes the existence of an optimal policy, of problem P 1 , that satisfies all the constraints with equality.
In Appendix D-A. From Proposition 7, we can see that problem P 1 has an optimal solution that satisfies all its constraints with equality. Therefore, to obtain a solution of problem P 1 , we can restrict our search to the set of such policies. Subsequently, a change of variable (by choosing ν k (q) =
k·p(k)·φ(k) d·qγ
) gives us the following linear program
Subject to:
The following proposition establishes a relation between the optimal solutions of problems P 1 and P 2 .
Proposition 8: Let {ν opt k , k ≥ 1} be an optimal solution of problem P 2 . If α 2 > α 1 , then we can obtain an optimal solution of problem P 1 as follows Therefore, to obtain an optimal solution of problem P 1 , we just need to solve P 2 and apply Proposition 8. Problem P 2 is a linear program and can be solved by any well-known LP-solver in polynomial time (O((k max ) 3.5 ) time, where k max is the maximum node degree in the network) [26] . However, we exploit the rich structure of this problem and
Here, k max is the maximum degree of the network. Consider a permutation σ : . The for loop in the algorithm is equivalent to filling these jars with water from another jar of unit capacity, in an ascending order, as given by the permutation σ. From steps 1, and 4 − 5 of Algorithm 2, it is easy to see that ν a is a feasible solution of problem P 2 . The optimality of ν a with respect to problem P 2 is established by the following proposition.
Proposition 9: The vector ν a returned by Algorithm 2 is an optimal solution of problem P 2 .
Proof: In Appendix E.
V. CASCADE SIZE MAXIMIZATION UNDER
BUDGET CONSTRAINT In this section, we consider the challenge faced by a resource-constrained campaigner. Such a campaigner desires to maximize the campaign size, but is constrained by a limited budget. Let c denote the limit on the expected incentivization cost. Then, we can formulate the cost-constrained cascade maximization problem as follows 
. Then, problem P 4 can be re-written as follows
Now, given a q ∈ (0, 1), consider the following criteria
If we can find a vector ν that satisfies the above criteria, then the 2-tuple (ν, q) is a feasible solution of problem P 5 . Let ν a (q) be the vector output by Algorithm 2 when q γ is set to q. From Proposition 9, we know that this vector minimizes the LHS of criterion (1) subject to criteria (2) and (3). Therefore, if we have d·q · k≥1 ν a k (q)·μ k (q) > c, then for the given value of q, no vector ν can satisfy criterion (1). Now, let ν a (q +Δq) be the vector output by Algorithm 2 when q γ is set to q + Δq.
Then, for any Δq
where Inequality (a) follows because the vector ν a (q) is an optimal solution and ν a (q + Δq) is just a feasible point at q, and Inequality (b) follows because Proposition 6) . From Inequality (10) we can conclude that if there does not exist a vector ν that satisfies criteria (1)-(3) for some q ∈ (0, 1), then no vector satisfies these criteria for any q ∈ (q, 1). Therefore, the optimal value q opt is given by the largest value of q in [0, 1] such that vector ν a (q) satisfies criteria (10), and can be computed using Algorithm 3. Algorithm 3 does a line search to find the largest value of q ∈ [0, 1] such that the tuple (ν a (q), q) meets criteria (1)-(3).
VI. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
We formulated and solved the optimization problems assuming an uncorrelated, locally tree-like and connected network. However, real world social networks may contain triads, loops, Figures 2 and 3 . The simulations presented in this section are averaged over 10000 runs.
To enhance legibility, error bars are suppressed in all the plots. We first evaluate the correctness of the analytical calculation of the campaign size, i.e., s(q). The simulation plots were generated by considering a linear threshold model where nodes register if at least 50% of their neighbours are active. We assume that 30% of the nodes in the network were zealous. For a different values of q, we studied three schemes: incentivizing all nodes equally (φ all ), incentivizing high degree nodes (φ high ) and incentivizing low degree nodes (φ low ). The incentives of the nodes, in these policies, where chosen such that q =
The analytical results were obtained by extracting the degree distribution from the networks.
The number of triangles in the p2p Gnutella network is very small, which is also reflected in the clustering coefficient. Therefore, the Gnutella network is very similar to a locally tree-like uncorrelated network. As consequence of this, for the Gnutella network, the simulation and analytical results are in excellent agreement with each other (see Fig. 4 ). On the other hand, one can observe a deviation of the simulation results from the analytical on the Hamsterster network (see Fig. 5 ). This behaviour may in part be due to the presence of significant number of triangles and loops in the network. Next, we consider a linear incentive structure, where an incentivized node obtains a unit reward per neighbour, i.e., c k = k, ∀ k ≥ 1. For the cost minimization problem, for a given γ, using the degree distributions, we analytically compute the solution φ and the average cost. We then simulate the linear threshold process (nodes register if at least 50% of their neighbours are active) on the respective real world networks using the analytical solution φ, and compare the average cost obtained from analysis and simulations (see Fig. 6 and Fig. 7) . Similarly, for the campaign size maximization problem we analytically compute φ and size s for a given cost budget c. The analytical solution is then used in the simulation of cascade maximization problem (see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 ).
As observed in Fig. 6 and 7, the analytical average cost is in excellent agreement with the simulated one for different values of α 1 , α 2 and γ, on both the networks. Similarly Fig. 8 and 9 show an excellent match between simulation and analytical computation of campaign size in almost all the plots. For large values of α 1 and α 2 , the simulated campaign size in the Hamsterster network is larger than the analytically computed campaign size. This may in part be due to the large number of triangles in the network. This suggests that in social networks containing large number of triangles and loops, the analytically computed cascade size may be a lower bound.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of campaigning in social networks by offering incentives for referrals. We used ideas from percolation theory to compute the campaign size, which was then used to formulate two optimization problems. These problems were not amenable to traditional solutions since they involved a fixed point equation whose solution was analytically intractable. We used results from reliability theory to establish some key properties of the fixed point that enabled us to solve these problems with simple algorithms having linarithmic time complexity. Although we assumed an uncorrelated and locally tree-like network in the analysis, through extensive simulations, we showed that our analytical results are applicable in real-world social networks. APPENDIX A SOME RESULTS FROM RELIABILITY THEORY Let X and Y be two random variables. Then, X is said to be smaller than Y in the usual stochastic order (denoted by
Next, we present two theorems from [29] without proof, and a lemma. We will use these theorems and lemma in several of our proofs. Z(n, p 1 ) and Z(n, p 2 ) be two binomial random variable with parameters (n, p 1 ) and (n, p 2 ), then for
Comparing the complementary cumulative distribution functions of the two random variables, and applying the definition of usual stochastic order.
Part (ii):
A binomial random variable with parameter (n, p) is the sum of n i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter p. Now, the result follows from an application of Part (i), and due to the closure of stochastic order under convolution (Theorem 11).
We also use a few results from the theory of stochastic convexity in our proofs. Therefore, for the sake of completeness, we reproduce some definitions and theorems from [29] . Let {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} be a parameterized collection of random variables. We say (a) {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} is stochastically increasing (SI) if E[ψ(X(θ))] is non-decreasing in θ for all non-decreasing functions ψ. 
Lemma 13: Let X(n, p) be a binomial random variable with parameters (n, p). Then, {X(n, p), p ∈ (0, 1)} ∈ SICX.
Proof: Combining example [29, Example 8.B.3 and Th. 8.B.9], it can shown that {X(n, p), p ∈ (0, 1)} ∈ SIL. Then, due to the fact that SIL ⇒ SICX, the lemma follows.
Theorem 14: Suppose {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} and {Y (θ), θ ∈ Θ} are two collections of random variables such that X(θ) and
Proof: See the proof of [29, Th. 8 
APPENDIX B EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE FIXED POINT
In this section, we show that for any q ∈ [0, 1], the fixed point Equation (3) has a unique solution. The proof in this section is split into two parts. In the first part, we show that function f (q, u) is monotonically increasing and convex in u.
In the second part, we use the result from first part to establish the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point.
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The differentiability of f (q, u) w.r.t. u follows from its definition. In this proposition, using results from stochastic convexity, we show that f (q, u) is monotonically increasing and convex in u ∈ (0, 1).
Let {X(k 2 , α 2 u), u ∈ (0, 1)} and {Y (k − k 2 , α 1 u), u ∈ (0, 1)} be two collections of independent binomial random variables with parameters (k 2 , α 2 u) and (k − k 2 , α 1 u), respectively. Then, from Lemma 13, we have
Since these random variables are independent, an application of Theorem 14 gives us {X( 
where Inequality (a) follows because h(u, k, k 2 , m) and
are non-decreasing and monotonically increasing functions of u, respectively. Similarly, we have
where Inequality (a) follows because h(u, k, k 2 , m) is convex in u.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We recollect that u denotes the probability of finding a registered node by following an arbitrary link in the network. Nodes with zero threshold do not need any recommendations, and are registered from the start of the campaign. Thus, if every node has threshold value zero, then the entire network is registered and we have u = 1. On the other hand, nodes with non-zero threshold have to be recommended by active nodes to register. Therefore, if all nodes in the network have non-zero thresholds, then there is no node from which the campaign can start. Hence, in such scenarios, we have u = 0. Now, let us consider the case where the fraction of zealous nodes lies in the interval (0, 1). Let us define f 0 (u) = f (q, u) − u. It is easy to see that u 0 is a fixed point of Equation (3) if and only if f 0 (u 0 ) = 0. By twice differentiating f 0 (u) with respect to u, we get
0 is a convex function of u. We also have
where Inequality (a) follows because the network is connected and the fraction of zealous nodes lies in the open interval (0, 1), and Inequality (b) follows because f (q, 1) is a convex combination of non-negative terms less or equal to 1 (some terms are strictly less than 1). Since f 0 (0) > 0 and f 0 (1) < 0, due to the continuity of function f 0 , there exists a point u 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that f 0 (u 0 ) = 0, i.e., f (q, u 0 ) = u 0 . We prove the uniqueness of the fixed point by contradiction. Now, if u 0 , u 1 ∈ (0, 1) are two fixed points of Equation (3), then we have f 0 (u 0 ) = f 0 (u 1 ) = 0. Without loss of generality, let us assume that 0 < u 0 < u 1 < 1. Now, choose positive real numbers u 2 ∈ (u 1 , 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that f 0 (u 2 ) < 0 and u 1 = λu 0 + (1 − λ)u 2 . Then, we have
Inequality (c) contradicts the convex nature of function f 0 . This establishes the uniqueness of the fixed point.
APPENDIX C INCREASING NATURE OF THE FIXED POINT
First, we introduce some notation and present some preliminary observations. We will use these in the proof of Proposition 3. The first step in the proof of Proposition 3 is to show that for any m ∈ N,
We note that if u ∈ (0, 1] then ϕ m,k (k 2 ) = 0 only if m > k, i.e., if the threshold is greater than the node degree.
Lemma 16:
Without loss of generality, let k 2 > k 2 and define the following random
where I i (p) are independent Bernoulli random variables with parameter p (i.e., P [I i (p) = 1] = p) and = st implies equality in distribution [29] . Therefore, for any k 2 , k 2 ∈ [0, k] and k 2 > k 2 , we have
where Inequality (a) follows because α 1 < α 2 ⇒ α 1 u ≤ α 2 u, and from Lemma 12. Hence, we have established that
where Inequality (b) follows because
Now, let us define
Due to Lemma 16, we can conclude that for any m, k ∈ N,
Next, we present a proposition that establishes that the function f (q, u) is monotonically increasing in q.
where Z(k − 1, q) is a binomial random variable with parameters (k − 1, q) that represents number of type 2 active neighbours of a (k − 1) degree node. Now, consider two real numbers
where (a) follows because q 1 < q 2 .
(b) is valid; Since for q 1 < q 2 , we have
where Inequality (c) follows because of Lemma 12, Lemma 16 and Theorem 10. From Equations (11) and (12), we can see that for any
Since the network is connected and the fraction of zealous nodes lies in the open interval (0, 1), there exist positive
-fraction of zealous nodes. Then, we have
Then, from the definition of a convex functions, we have
where Inequality (b) follows because we have f (q, u q ) = u q . From Inequality (13), we have f (q, u q ) ≥ u q . This contradicts the fact that f (q, u q ) < u q . Since this contradiction was due to the assumption that
APPENDIX D EQUIVALENCE WITH THE LINEAR PROGRAM
In this section, we prove the equivalence between problems P 1 and P 2 presented in Section IV.
D. Proof of Proposition 7
Let the value of the objective of problem P 1 for incentivepolicy φ be denoted as c(φ). (14) and
From Equality (14) and Inequality (15) we can see that φ opt is a feasible solution of problem P 1 . Further, we also have
where Inequality (a) follows because φ opt ≤ φ o , Inequality (b) follows because q 0 > q γ and s k (q) is non-decreasing function of q (Proposition 6), and Inequality (c) follows because φ o is an optimal solution of problem P 1 .
Since the costs for policies φ o and φ opt are equal, and φ o is an optimal policy, we can conclude that policy φ opt is also an optimal solution of problem P 1 .
E. Proof of Proposition 8
Let ν opt = {ν opt k , k ≥ 1} be an optimal solution of problem P 2 . Let us define
Then, we have (17) where Equality (a) and Inequality (b) follows because {ν opt k , k ≥ 1} is a feasible solution of problem P 2 . From Equality (16) and Inequality (17), we can conclude that φ f is a feasible solution of problem P 1 . Now, let φ opt = {φ 
This implies that φ f is also an optimal solution of problem P 1 .
APPENDIX E OPTIMALITY OF ALGORITHM 2
In this section, we prove that the vector ν a returned by Algorithm 2 is an optimal point of problem P 2 . However, as a first step, we prove the following lemma. Let S = {1, 2, · · · , k max } where k max is the maximum node degree.
Lemma 18: Let ν, a 1 × k max vector, be a feasible solution of problem P 2 . Then, we have 
where Inequality (a) follows because ν is a feasible solution of problem P 2 . Now, let us assume that 
F. Proof of Proposition 9
Let ν be a feasible solution of problem P 2 . Since ν a and ν are feasible solutions of problem P 2 , we have j≥1 ν a (σ(j)) = j≥1 ν(σ(j)) = 1. Let X a and X be two independent random variables taking values in the set S such that P [X a = j] = ν a σ(j) and P [X = j] = ν σ(j) . Then, from Lemma 18, we have
From above inequality and the definition of usual stochastic order, we can see that X a ≤ st X. Therefore, we have
where Inequality (a) follows from an application of Theorem 10 (X a ≤ st X and μ σ(j) (q γ ) is a non-decreasing function of j).
Let ν opt be an optimal solution of P 2 . Then, we have the following inequalities
a is an optimal solution of P 2
where Inequality (b) follows by setting ν to ν opt in Inequality (19) .
